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P.2d 917, 926 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (holding that Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d) leaves the
question of costs "somewhat in the discretion of the courts."). Likewise, the denial of
Sweazey9s post-trial motion to reconsider in which he first raised his objection to the
award of this particular cost, is also reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See
In the Matter of the General Determination of Rights, 982 P.2d 65, 71 (Utah 1999).
3.

Whether the trial court erred in allowing Sweazey5 s attorney to withdraw

eight months prior to the trial. This issue was not raised by Sweazey until May 12, 2005,
when he raised the issue in his "Motion for Reconsideration." (R. 444-454). Standard of
Review: Flying J agrees with Sweazey that the standard of review with regard to this
issue is abuse of discretion. (Appellant's Brief at p. 7). Likewise, the denial of
Sweazey's post-trial motion to reconsider in which he first raised this issue, is also
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See In the Matter of the General
Determination of Rights, 982 P.2d 65, 71 (Utah 1999).
4.

Whether the trial court judge demonstrated bias during the trial and prior

proceedings and, if so, whether Sweazey waived any complaint relating to judicial bias by
failing to file a timely motion to disqualify. This issue was not raised by Sweazey until
May 12, 2005, when he raised the issue in his "Motion for Reconsideration." (R. 444454). Standard of Review: Denial of Sweazey's post-trial motion to reconsider in which
he first raised the issue of a bias is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See In
the Matter of the General Determination of Rights, 982 P.2d 65, 71 (Utah 1999).
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(b)(l)(B)(iii) the date on which the moving party learns or with the exercise
of reasonable diligence should have learned of the grounds upon which the
motion is based,
If the last event occurs fewer than 20 days prior to a hearing, the motion
shall be filed as soon as practicable.
Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(a) If a motion is not pending and a certificate of readiness for trial has not
been filed, an attorney may withdraw from the case by filing with the court
and serving on all parties a notice of withdrawal. The notice of withdrawal
shall include the address of the attorney's client and a statement that no
motion is pending and no certificate of readiness for trial has been filed. If
a motion is pending or a certificate of readiness for trial has been filed, an
attorney may not withdraw except upon motion and order of the court. The
motion to withdraw shall describe the nature of any pending motion and the
date and purpose of any scheduled hearing.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This case involves Sweazey's personal injury claim arising out of an incident at a

Flying J propane filling station in December 1997. Sweazey had taken four propane tanks
to the store to be filled. During the filling process, propane began to leak out of the
connection, as tends to happen from time to time during the normal filling process.
Rather than let the Flying J attendant doing the filling remedy this situation (which was
not creating any emergency situation), Sweazey voluntarily and inexplicably reached in
with his hands and tightened the connection, exposing his hands to the propane for one

second. He subsequently brought this action seeking damage for alleged injury to his
hands.
B.

Course of Proceedings in the Trial Court
Sweazey filed his complaint in this action on October 7,1999. (R. 3). On

December 29, 2000, Sweazey's original counsel filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel
after which Sweazey represented himselfpro se. See Withdrawal of Counsel (R. 34).
During the course of discovery, Sweazey refused to respond to Flying J's discovery
requests seeking information regarding his claims for economic damages (i.e. lost wages).
The trial court issued an order compelling Sweazey to respond to discovery (R. 79), and
later granted a motion to strike Sweazey's economic damage claims based on Sweazey's
failure to respond to discovery regarding su.ch damages. (R. 130).
On February 13,2004, after representing himself in this action pro se for over
three years, Sweazey retained new counsel who entered their appearance in the action on
February 13, 2004. See Notice of Appearance of Counsel for Plaintiff (R. 181). On July
6, 2004, the trial court issued an Order for Scheduling Conference which, among other
things, gave notice that the issue of a "jury or nonjury trial" would be discussed at a
scheduling conference set for August 2,2004. See Order for Scheduling Conference (R.
284). On August 2,2004, the trial court held the scheduling conference. Both Sweazey,
his counsel, and counsel for Flying J appeared at the scheduling conference. During the
scheduling conference, Sweazey9s counsel requested leave to withdraw as counsel and

filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel, or in the Alternative Motion to Withdraw as
Counsel at that time. See Minutes Law and Motion (R. 286); Withdrawal of Counsel or,
in the Alternative, Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for the Plaintiff (R. 289). Sweazey
did not object to the withdrawal of his counsel and in fact, entered his personal
appearance on the record and agreed on the record that the notice requirements of Rule
74(b) had been satisfied. See Order Granting Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for
Plaintiff (R. 292). The trial court then proceeded to set a three day bench trial starting
December 7, 2004. See Minutes Law and Motion (R. 286). Neither Sweazey nor his
counsel, who was still at the scheduling conference, objected to the setting of a bench trial
rather than a jury trial.
On November 22, 2004, Sweazey requested that the trial setting be stricken due to
a medical condition. The trial court granted the request. See Minutes Pretrial Conference
(R. 295). On January 3, 2005, the trial court held another scheduling conference at which
the court set a bench trial starting April 5, 2005. See Minutes Law and Motion (R. 301).
Sweazey did not object to the bench trial setting at the April 5, 2005 scheduling
conference. A one day bench trial was held on April 6, 2005. See Minutes Beach Trial
(R. 428).
C.

Disposition in the Court Below
Trial was held on April 6, 2005. The trial court found that Flying J was not

negligent in any way with regard to the December 9, 1997 incident. The trial court

further found that it was Sweazey who acted negligently and that even if an appellate
court were to disagree with the trial court's conclusion that Flying J was not negligent,
Flying J was in "no event more negligent than Sweazey." The trial court further found
that Sweazey failed to present any evidence showing that he suffered medical injuries
caused by his exposure to the propane. Order and Judgment, Conclusion of Law 6 (R.
463-64). Based on these and numerous other findings in favor of Flying J, the trial court
entered no cause of action against Sweazey, dismissed his claims with prejudice, and
awarded Flying J $741.63 in costs pursuant to Rule 54(d). Order and Judgment (R. 464465).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Background
Sweazey has not appealed any of the Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law of
the trial court. The following background facts are set forth in order to set the issues on
appeal into the context of the action.
On December 9, 1997, Sweazey took four propane tanks to the Flying J store at
2100 South and 900 West, Salt Lake City, Utah, to be filled with propane. The Flying J
attendant, Nancy Beahm, attached the propane dispenser nozzle to one of Sweazey's
tanks. During the filling process, propane sprayed outfromthe connection. The
attendant did not ask Sweazey for assistance. Order and Judgment, Findings of Fact at fflf
1-3, 12 (R. 459-60).

It is usual and customary in the propane filling industry that some amount of
propane unavoidably and routinely escapes into the atmosphere during the propane filling
process. When propane leaks during the filling process, normal procedure is for the
attendant to shut off the flow of propane and then tighten the connection. Id, at ^ 7, 9
(R. 459)
Sweazey, who was not wearing gloves, reached forward with his bare hands and
tightened the connection. The actual amount of time that Sweazey9 s hands were in the
leaking propane was approximately one second. Id. atfflf5-6 (R. 459). Sweazey later
complained of thermal injuries to his hands that he believed were caused by the contact
with the escaping propane. Medical testing never revealed any objective evidence of
injury to Sweazey's hands. According to Sweazey's treating physician, Dr. Stephen
Morris, any injury to Sweazey's hands was minor and trivial. Id. atfflf21-23 (R. 460-61)
Liquid propane dissipates into the atmosphere immediately upon release, making it
impossible for liquid propane to remain in liquid form on a person's hands. The
temperature of propane upon its release into the atmosphere is negative 44 degrees
Fahrenheit. Exposure to leaking propane at negative 44 degrees Fahrenheit for one
second could not cause severe or permanent injury to Sweazey's hands. Exposure to
leaking propane for a short period of time may cause, at most, minor frostbite. Id. at <|ffl
28-31 (R. 461).

The Flying J propane filling station was located in an open, well ventilated area.
Propane does not present an explosion hazard in unconfined areas such as the Flying J
propane filling station at issue in this case. There was no evidence that anyone was
smoking in the area of the propane filling station. Even if there were such evidence,
propane requires an openflameto ignite and cannot be ignited from a cigarette. There
was no evidence of any ignition source that could have ignited leaking propane. Even if
an ignition source were present, there was no risk of explosion from the leaking propane
in the open area because propane dissipates immediately into the atmosphere and is not
concentrated enough in an open area to ignite and explode. Id. atfflf15-20 (R. 460).
Facts Related to Specific Issues on Appeal
The following Statement of Facts is organized relevant to each of the issues on
appeal.
Issue 1: Waiver of Jury Trial
On July 6, 2004, the trial court gave notice that it would hold a scheduling
conference on August 2, 2004. "Jury or nonjury trail" was listed as an item to be
discussed. Order for Scheduling Conference (R. 284). Sweazey, his counsel, and counsel
for Flying J appeared at the scheduling conference. August 2, 2005 Minutes Law and
Motion (R. 286) (indicating those present). At the scheduling conference Sweazey's
counsel moved for leave to withdraw as counsel. The reasons for the withdrawal
included, but were not limited to, (1) Sweazey was failing to pay his attorneys and (2)

Sweazey and his counsel had a "fundamental disagreement" "regarding the propriety of
proceeding with this action through trial based upon the medical evidence currently
available." Withdrawal of Counsel or, in the Alternative, Motion to Withdraw as Counsel
for the Plaintiff atffif3(a), (c) (R. 290-291). The court granted Sweazey's counsel's
motion to withdraw. August 2,2005 Minutes Law and Motion (R. 286). There is nothing
in the Record indicating that Sweazey objected to his counsel's withdrawal. (R. 292).
The trial court order setting the bench trial was issued while Sweazey's counsel was
present in the court and was issued before the court entered the order allowing Sweazey's
counsel to withdraw. See August 26, 2004 Order Granting Motion to Withdraw as
Counsel for Plaintiff (R. 292).
On January 3, 2005, the trial court held another scheduling conference attended by
Sweazey. Minutes Law and Motion (R. 301). The trial court's January 3, 2005
scheduling order states that "Bench trial is set for 3 days starting April 5, 2005." There is
nothing in the Record indicating that Plaintiff objected to a bench trial. (R. 301).
During a March 14, 2005 telephonic pretrial conference, the Court rescheduled the
bench trial to begin April 6, 2005. Again, there is nothing in the Record indicating that
Sweazey objected to a bench trial. (R. 315).
The bench trial commenced on April 6,2005. Sweazey did not request a jury trial
before or during the trial. The issue of a jury trial was not raised by Sweazey until May

12, 2005, thirty six days after trial, when he raised the issue for the first time in his
"Motion for Reconsideration." (R. 444-454).
Issue 2: Award of Costs
Sweazey was deposed by Flying J on May 2,2000. Court reporter fees for the
deposition totaled $673.13. (R.437). In accordance with Rule 54(d), Flying J filed a
Memorandum of Costs and Request for Award of Costs on April 13,2005. (R. 432).
Flying J requested total costs of $741.63, which included the $673.13 in deposition costs.
On May 12, 2005, nearly one month after Flying J filed its Request for Award of Cots,
Sweazey filed an Objection to Proposed Judgment and Order Dismissing Action with
Prejudice in which he objected to the $673.13 in deposition costs on the sole ground that
he had received a bankruptcy discharge after the deposition but long before the trial. (R.
455-57). On May 16, 2005, the court awarded Flying J $741.63 in costs in its Order and
Judgment. (R. 466.)
Issue 3: Withdrawal of Counsel
Sweazey's original counsel voluntarily withdrew on December 29, 2000. (R. 34).
Sweazey represented himselfpro se for over three years until his new counsel, Morrison
& Morrison, appeared in this case in February 2004. (R. 181) Six months later, Morrison
& Morrison filed a motion to withdraw on the basis that (among other things) "a conflict
and/or fundamental disagreement has arisen between counsel and the plaintiff regarding
the continued propriety of proceeding with this action through trial, based upon the

medical evidence currently available" and Sweazey was failing to pay his legal fees.
(R.291). The court granted Sweazey9s counsel's motion to withdraw from the bench at
the August 2, 2004 hearing (R. 286) and entered an order to that effect on August 26,
2004. (R. 292). There is nothing in the record indicating that Sweazey objected to Mr.
Morrison's withdrawal. (R. 292).
Issue 4: Judicial Bias
During the April 6, 2005 bench trial, the court questioned Flying J's counsel about
the applicability of a $3,000 threshold regarding medical bills. Flying J's counsel
responded that it was aware of the $3,000 threshold under the Utah no-fault insurance law
(Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309), but that such threshold only applied in automobile
accident cases and had no applicability in this case.1 The court nonetheless included in its
ruling from the bench that, as a separate basis for its decision, Sweazey did meet the
threshold. The court vacated this ruling during a telephonic conference call on April 8,
2005. (R. 430). Nothing concerning such a threshold was included in the court's Order
and Judgment. (R.458-465).
Sweazey has cited to no facts in the record that indicate judicial bias, and Flying J
believes there are no such facts. Neither Sweazey nor his counsel ever filed any motion
to disqualify the trial court judge.
1

Sweazey failed to obtain a transcript of the trial as required under Rule 11 even though
Flying J filed a designation of that portion of the transcript to be included in the record on
appeal. Nevertheless, Flying J's recitation of the trial court's query regarding the $3,000

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The issues on appeal are improperly before the Court because they were not raised
before the trial court. Further, Sweazey's issues on appeal are without merit and should
be denied and the trial court's judgment and order affirmed. Sweazey waived his right to
a jury trial. Sweazey failed to object to Flying J's request for costs in the time allowed
under Rule 54(d), and in any event, the 2005 award of fees was not discharged by
Sweazey's 2000 bankruptcy. The trial court properly allowed Sweazey's counsel to
withdraw for non-payment of fees and disagreement over whether Sweazey's case had
sufficient merit to proceed to trial. Sweazey has cited no evidence of bias by the trial
court and waived any complaint of bias by failing to file a timely motion to disqualify.
Finally, even if there were any error, such error was harmless.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SWEAZEY FAILED TO PRESERVE HIS ISSUES ON APPEAL BY NOT RAISING
THE ISSUES IN THE TRIAL COURT
Sweazey has not challenged any of the findings of fact or conclusions of law of the
trial court. Rather, his complaints are procedural in nature. Sweazey has cited to nothing
in the record to show that any of these procedural issues were brought to the attention of

threshold is accurate and consistent with the court's minute entry (R. 430) in which the
court discusses the issue.
1 *5

the trial court in a timely manner and are therefore improperly before this court on appeal.
As the Utah Supreme Court recently affirmed,
As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised
on appeal. A party cannot circumvent that rule by merely mentioning an
issue without introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal authority;
such a mere mention does not preserve that issue for appeal. The
preservation requirement is based on the premise that, in the interest of
orderly procedure, the trial court ought to be given an opportunity to
address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it. Accordingly, an
objection must at least be raised to a level of consciousness such that the
trial court can consider it.
State v. Cruz, 122 P.3d 543, 553 (Utah 2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The first time Sweazey made mention of any of the issues on appeal was on May
12, 2005, thirty six days after the conclusion of the trial, when he mentioned the issues in
his Motion for Reconsideration. However, as this Court has explained, "[a] motion to
reconsider is not expressly available under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Salt Lake
City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Although
Rule 54(b) allows a court, in its discretion, to change its mind in cases where the court
has entered judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all of the claims of the parties, this
rule would have no application in this case where all claims were decided on April 6,
2005.
Further, the proper procedural mechanism for Sweazey to raise his issues of (1)
wanting a new trial before a jury; (2) claiming unfairness because his counsel withdrew
eight months before trial; and (3) his unsubstantiated claim of judicial bias, would have

14

been a Rule 59 motion for a new trial. See Utah R. Civ. P. 59 (grounds for new trial
include "irregularity in the proceedings" and being prevented from having a "fair trial").
Sweazey never made such a motion.
Notwithstanding that these issues are improperly before the Court, none of
Sweazey's complaints are supported by applicable law. Furthermore, Sweazey fails to
make a single citation to the record in support of his arguments.
POINT II
SWEAZEY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
Waiver of therightto jury trial was addressed by this Court in Aspenwood, L.L. C.
v. C.A.T., L.L.C., 73 P.3d 947 (Utah Ct. App. 2003), cert denied 72 P.3d 685 (2003).
According to this Court, "[generally, a party who does not object to a bench trial setting
waives the right to a trial by jury." Id, at 955. As Sweazey states in his brief, the case
was changed from a jury trial to a bench trial on August 2, 2004, at a hearing where
Sweazey was represented by counsel. Sweazey Brief at 7. There is nothing in the record
to indicate that Sweazey or his counsel ever objected to a bench trial. Even during the
trial, at which no jury was present, Sweazey never so much as suggested he wanted a jury
trial.
Like Sweazey, the plaintiff in Aspenwood had requested a jury trial in its original
complaint, but failed to object to the court scheduling a bench trial. This Court held that
"the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that [the plaintiff] waived its

right to a jury trial because, after having notice that the trial was set before the bench, [the
plaintiff] failed to object until the eve of trial." Id. at 956.
Whereas the plaintiff in Aspenwood finally objected to a bench rather than a jury
trial on the eve of trial, Sweazey never objected to a bench trial until more than a month
after the trial occurred. Thus, it is clear that Sweazey waived his right to a jury trial under
applicable precedent. To rule otherwise would allow a party like Sweazey to request a
jury trial, remain silent when a bench trial is set, evaluate the outcome of the trial, and
then if the outcome is undesirable, claim that a jury trial should have been held. The
courts should not allow litigants a "second bite at the apple" by consenting to a bench trial
through silence.
POINT III
THE COURT PROPERLY AWARDED COSTS PURSUANT TO RULE 54(d)
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d) provides that "costs shall be allowed as of course to the
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d). The trial court
awarded Flying J $741.63 for costs pursuant to Rule 54(d), including $673.13 for the cost
of deposing Sweazey. (R.465).
The Utah Supreme Court has held that deposition costs are taxable "costs" for
purposes of Rule 54(d) when "the trial court is persuaded that they were taken in good
faith and, in the light of the circumstances, appeared to be essential for the development
and presentation of the case." Highland Constr. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042,

1051 (Utah 1984). Flying J set out its explanation regarding each of these factors in its
Memorandum of Costs and Request for Award of Costs Pursuant to Rule 54(D). (R.
433).
Sweazey argues that costs cannot be taxed against him because he obtained a
discharge of debts in 2003. The Bankruptcy Code provides that a discharge under
Chapter 7 applies to "all debts that arose before the date of the order.59 11 U.S.C. §
727(b). However, the liability for the costs that were taxed against Sweazey did not arise
until April 6, 2005, when Flying J prevailed in this action against him and an award of
costs became available to Flying J as the prevailing party under Rule 54(b). At least one
federal Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that "We have also endorsed the notion that by
voluntarily continuing to pursue litigation post-petition that had been initiated prepetition, a debtor may be held personally liable for attorney fees and costs that result from
that litigation." Boeing N. Am., Inc. v. Ybarra (In re Ybarra), 424 F.3d 1018, 1024 (9th
Cir. 2005)

Additionally, Flying J filed its Memorandum of Costs on April 13, 2005. (R. 436).
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2), Sweazey was required to file any objection to the
memorandum within 7 days. He failed to do so and therefore any objection to the costs
was waived.
POINT IV
THE COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED SWEAZEY'S COUNSEL TO WITHDRAW
Utah R. Civ. P. 74 grants trial courts the authority to allow an attorney to withdraw
even if a motion is pending or a case is ready for trial. Morrison & Morrison's motion to
withdraw as Sweazey's counsel set forth ample reason to justify the Court's exercise of
its discretion. As Sweazey's counsel stated in their motion to withdraw, Sweazey was not
paying costs and fees as he had agreed. More importantly, Sweazey and his counsel
disagreed over the current state of the medical evidence in this case and whether the case
had enough merit to proceed to trial. As it turned out, Sweazey's counsel was correct—
there was not sufficient evidence to proceed to trial in this meritless and frivolous action.
Sweazey's counsel was prohibited under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
from advancing a case that was not supported by fact. See Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2)
(providing that by advocating a position in court, an attorney certifies that the position has
evidentiary support). Here, Sweazey's own treating physician testified that any injury to
Sweazey was "minor and trivial." Counsel could not ethically be expected to take such a
case to trial. Under these circumstances, Morrison & Morrison was justified in moving

to withdraw as counsel in this case and the trial court was more than justified in granting
the motion.
Further, Sweazey has failed to cite any evidence that he objected to Morrison &
Morrison's withdrawal at the time. Consequently, any objection Sweazey may have had
was waived. It is also worth noting that trial did not commence until approximately eight
months after Morrison & Morrison was allowed to withdraw, a fact that tends to discount
any alleged prejudice Sweazey may have suffered from the withdrawal of his counsel. It
should also be remembered that Sweazey represented himself in this case for over three
years before Morrison & Morrison entered their appearance.
Perhaps most importantly, Sweazey has failed to provide any support for his
contention that allowing Morrison & Morrison to withdraw eight months before trial
constituted reversible error. Sweazey has instead argued that the withdrawal may have
constituted a breach of Rule 1.16(b)(1) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. (Sweazey
Brief at p. 8). While this (if true) may give rise to a bar complaint or malpractice claim
against his counsel, it does not constitute reversible error. Sweazey had norightto
counsel in this civil case. See generally, Cruz, 122 P.3d at 555 ("defendant may claim
ineffective assistance of counsel only if he had arightto counsel in thefirstplace .... and
Cruz had norightto counsel in the civil forfeiture action.")
On top of these other flaws, Sweazey misconstrues the standard in Rule 1.16(b)(1)
as prohibiting withdrawal if it will "materially adversely affect the interests of the client."

Sweazey Brief at p.8. Instead, Rule 1.16(b) states that withdrawal is allowable if no such
impact will occur or if there is a fundamental disagreement between counsel and client or
if the client fails to fulfill its obligation to pay fees incurred or if the representation will
impose an unreasonable burden on counsel or if other good cause exists. Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.16(b)(l-7). Morrison & Morrison alleged each of these
circumstances in its motion. (R. 289-291).
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ACT WITH BIAS
According to Sweazey, "at the commencement of the trail [sic] proceeding Judge
Iwasaki instructed counsel to determine if the case could be dismissed based on the a [sic]
$3000 dollar threshold .... the fact that the judge was instructing the opposing counsel in
how to dismiss the case shows bias and predisposition against the Appellant which may
have influenced prior decisions during the proceedings." Sweazey Brief at 8.
In fact, at the end of Sweazey's presentation of his case, the Court did question
Flying J's counsel about the applicability of such a threshold and whether it was a basis
for dismissal. In response, Flying J counsel asserted that, while they were aware of a
$3,000 threshold under Utah's no-fault personal injury protection law, such a threshold
only applied to automobile accident cases and had no applicability in this action. The
Court later acknowledged that Flying J's counsel was accurate on this point. (R. 430).

Nothing concerning such a threshold was included in the court's Order and Judgment.
(R.458-465).
One of the proper roles of the trial court is to determine if a particular rule of law
applies to the facts at hand. In meeting this role, it is entirely proper for the trial court to
question parties' counsel on applicable law. There is absolutely nothing in the facts
alleged by Sweazey that indicate any degree of bias. To the contrary, a review of the
record in this case, spanning six years, reveals that the trial court was extraordinarily
patient with Sweazey, allowing him to continue to trial despite Sweazey's repeated delay
and failure to cooperate in this case. Sweazey failed to cooperate in discovery. See Order
(R. 79). Sweazey refused and failed to pay court ordered sanctions for failure to appear at
a scheduling conference). See January 8, 2002 Minutes Law & Motion (R. 11 l)(Ordering
Sweazey to pay $250 in attorney's fees for failing to appear at the scheduling
conference); Flying J Motion Dismiss (R. 146) (arguing for dismissal of case based on
Sweazey's failure to pay the $250. The court denied the motion (R. 175)). Sweazey was
ordered on two occasions to show cause why his case should not be dismissed for failure
to prosecute. See Notices of Order to Show Cause (R. 36, R. 136). Sweazey requested
and was granted a continuance of the trial date. (R. 295). The trial court gave Sweazey
every opportunity to have his case heard in court and was more than fair in its treatment
of Sweazey.

As to Sweazey's allegations that Mr. Morrison and Judge Iwasaki were "college
buddies" and that this influenced Judge Iwasaki's decision to grant the motion to
withdraw, Flying J has no knowledge of anything in the record to support this statement.
Pursuant to Rule 63 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to disqualify a judge
must be made no later than 20 days after (i) assignment of the case to the judge; (ii)
appearance of the party or the party's attorney; or (iii) the date on which the moving party
learns or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of the grounds
upon which the motion was based. Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b). Here, Sweazey never raised
this issue until over a month after the conclusion of trial. As argued above, Sweazey's
complaint on this point is untimely (as well as without merit) and should be denied. See
Wade v. Stangl, 869 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (internal citations and quotations
omitted) (Utah rules "require[] that a party alleging judicial bias or prejudice must first
file an affidavit to that effect in the trial court. We will not, therefore, consider the issue
of judicial bias or prejudice when it is raised, as in the present case, for the first time on
appeal.").
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POINT VI
ANY ERROR WAS HARMLESS
Based on the actual events at trial and the unchallenged findings of fact which
were overwhelming in favor of Flying J, even if Sweazey's first, third, and fourth issues
on appeal had merit (which they do not) there is no reason to believe that any of these
issues could possibly amount to anything more than harmless error. See, e.g., Armed
Forces Insur. Exchange v. Harrison, 70 P.3d 35,41 (Utah 2003) ("'If the error was
harmless, that is, if the error was sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable
likelihood that if affected the outcome of the case, then a reversal is not in order.'")
{quoting Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1255 (Utah 1997)).
Even putting aside for the moment the overwhelming evidence and unchallenged
findings of fact that any negligence regarding the incident was totally attributable to
Sweazey for voluntarily sticking his hands into the leaking propane, he was unable to
show any injury. His own doctor—the treating physician for his alleged injuriestestified that "any injury to Sweazey's hands was minor and trivial." Finding of Fact No.
23 (R. 461). A necessary element of his claim for personal injury was actual injury which
he could not establish.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the trial court's order and
judgment in favor of Flying J.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3 ^ day of January 2006.
MABEY MURRAY, LC

lyf

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 3 C ^ day of January, 2006,1 caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE FLYING J, INC. to be served by United
States first class mail, postage prepaid, on the following:
Donnie Sweazey
3460 South 500 West
South Salt Lake, UT 84115
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